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On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“Patient Protection Act”), promising that it “will set in 
motion reforms that generations of Americans have fought 
for and marched for and hungered to see.”1 Minutes later, 14 
state Attorneys General sued to prevent implementation of 
the Act, arguing that it is unconstitutional.a,2
The lawsuits might be considered the most recent 
chapter in the post-1965 health reform saga, in which 
intense political battles have stymied efforts to address 
the nation’s growing health care crisis. As this recent battle 
leaves Congress and heads to the courts, we are reminded 
of that famous quote: “The law is what the judge says it is.”b 
Similarly, the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says 
it is, or rather, what a majority of Supreme Court Justices 
says it is. This commentary describes both the Attorneys 
General claims and the legal framework in which they will be 
examined, should their claims proceed to a court’s scrutiny. 
It must be recognized, however, that any legal analysis of 
a dispute of this magnitude is inherently connected to the 
political context in which such a dispute arises. Accordingly, 
policy experts need to understand both the relevant law and 
the underlying politics, and any constitutional analysis of the 
Patient Protection Act rests, as a foundational matter, on the 
ultimate determination of nine Justices.
Political Background
As is well known, the Patient Protection Act navigated 
through highly partisan currents and passed Congress on a 
narrow party-line vote. Despite repeated exhortations from 
both Republicans and Democrats that bipartisan consensus 
is both possible and desirable in any health care reform 
package,c and despite oft-repeated statements by leaders of 
both parties that Democrats and Republicans are primarily 
in agreement on most foundational matters,d the Act was 
approved amid highly contentious, and often vitriolic, 
accusations. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell 
(R-Kentucky) called the bill “a monstrosity held together by 
special deals, a rejection of the clear will of the voters, and 
presidential appeals to put party first.”3 Senator Jim DeMint 
(R-South Carolina) called it a “trillion dollar assault on our 
freedoms [and an] arrogant power grab [that] proves that 
the President and his party care more about government 
control than the will of the American people.”4 Even months 
after passage, Republican campaign materials continue 
emphasizing the Act’s promotion of government largess, 
describing the Act as a “government takeover of health 
care.”5 (Democrats, it must be noted, engaged in equally 
sharp and immoderate language, accusing Republicans of 
“[standing] with insurance companies and their Washington 
lobbyists and against reform.”6)
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a. The Florida Attorney General filed a suit on behalf of 13 state Attorneys General, and the Virginia Attorney General filed a separate 
suit. Additional constitutional challenges against the Patient Protection Act were filed by the Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons, Inc., New Jersey Physicians, Inc., and the Thomas More Law Center. The complaint filed by the Florida Attorney General 
was amended on May 14, 2010, to include two more state Attorneys General and five governors (plus the National Federation of 
Independent Businesses) bringing the total of state plaintiffs to 20. 
b. This quote is sometimes attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes, as emblematic of the philosophy of legal realism. See Brigham J, 
Harrington C. Realism in the authority of law. Social Epistemology. 1991;5(1):20-25 (describing quote as “Holmes’s dictum”). Other 
sources attribute the quote to Lord Reid, in: Reid L. The judge as law maker. J Socy Pub Tchrs L. 1972;12(22):22-29.
c. See, e.g., Chaddock GR. A bipartisan health care plan? ‘Yes we can,’ say former senate leaders. Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2009 
(describing a bipartisan proposal by former Senators Daschle, Dole, and Baker as “a counterpoint to the first Senate markup of health 
care legislation, which fell out along sharply partisan lines”).
d. See, e.g., Berger J. McCain nudges Obama toward his party’s health plans. New York Times. January 24, 2010 (reporting that Republican 
Senator John McCain, whom Obama defeated in the 2008 presidential election, urged Democrats to join Republicans in bipartisan 
negotiations, saying “[t]here are things we can agree on”); Obama BH. Remarks at the Opening Session of a Bipartisan Meeting on Health 
Care Reform [transcript]. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000122/pdf/DCPD-201000122.pdf. Published February 25, 2010. 
(“[W]hen I look at the ideas that are out there, there is overlap. It’s not perfect overlap, it’s not a hundred percent overlap, but there’s 
some overlap.”)
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On March 23, 2010, President 
Obama signed into law 
the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act…Minutes 
later, 14 state Attorneys General 
sued to prevent implementation 
of the Act, arguing that it is 
unconstitutional.
Republican fears of unconstrained and corrupting 
government expansions of power are echoed in the state 
Attorneys’ General suits.e The complaint filed by the Florida 
Attorney General, which was amended on May 14th and 
now is on behalf of 20 state plaintiffs, decries the Patient 
Protection Act as “an unprecedented encroachment on the 
liberty of individuals” and “an unprecedented encroachment 
on the sovereignty of the states.”7 Accompanying lawsuits 
challenging the Patient Protection Act’s constitutionality 
further charged that the Act “imposes unprecedented 
government mandates that restrict the personal and 
economic freedoms of American citizens,”8 “forc[es] 
the collectivization of health care and the establishment 
of a system of socialized health care in this country,”9 
and requires judicial relief “to preserve individual liberty 
and choice under Social Security, as well as to prevent… 
bankrupting the United States generally and Medicare and 
Social Security specifically.”10 
Behind the complaints’ sweeping rhetoric are important 
legal issues that implicate nothing less than foundational 
constitutional principles. The Constitution creates a federal 
government of only limited authority, and thus any federal 
action must rest on one of the enumerated powers listed in 
the Constitution. But the Constitution also places additional 
independent limits on federal powers, and any federal action 
that transgresses these limits is unconstitutional even if it is 
otherwise within one of the enumerated powers. Accordingly, 
a constitutional analysis of the Patient Protection Act will 
proceed in two parts: (1) does the authority to implement 
the Act reside within one of the federal 
government’s enumerated powers? And 
if so, (2) does the implementation of the 
Act transgress one of the Constitution’s 
independent limits on federal power? 
The constitutional provisions that will be 
interpreted and applied in this analysis 
are the provisions intended to preserve 
the nation’s federalist system.
The constitutional challenges to the 
Patient Protection Act rest primarily on 
two arguments, each corresponding to 
one of the steps in the above constitutional 
analysis.f The first argument charges that 
the Patient Protection Act relies on federal 
powers that are beyond those enumerated 
in the Constitution. The second argument 
claims that the Act encroaches upon the 
sovereignty of the states and thereby 
transgresses independent constitutional limits on federal 
power. Thus, two related and fundamental constitutional 
principles—limits to federal power and protections of state 
sovereignty—serve as the foundations to the legal attacks 
on the Patient Protection Act. They also have been the focus 
of what were likely the Rehnquist Court’sg most significant 
decisions. All of the Rehnquist Court’s seminal cases that 
delineated its federalism jurisprudence were divisive five-to-
four decisions, and even though four of the Rehnquist Court’s 
nine Justices have since retired, the Court’s current make-up 
(assuming Elena Kagan is confirmed as the next Justice and 
e. Additional partisan tension has erupted within individual states. Four Democratic governors promptly distanced themselves from 
their own Attorneys General, stating their support for health reform and calling the Act “the single most important reform of our 
health care system in decades.” Pennsylvania Office of the Governor. Governor Rendell joins other governors in offer to help US 
Attorney General defend legality of new national health care act [press release]. Published March 26, 2010. http://www.portal.
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_789728_0_0_18/Governor%20Rendell%20Joins%20Other%20Governors%20
in%20Offer%20to%20Help%20U.S.%20Attorney.doc (reprinting governors’ letter to US Attorney General Eric Holder). Meanwhile 
in Georgia, the Democratic Attorney General refused the request of the state’s Republican governor to challenge the federal 
health reform law. See Baker TE. Letter to Governor Sonny Perdue. Published March 24, 2010. http://law.ga.gov/vgn/images/portal/
cit_79369762/157880827Response%20to%20Perdue.pdf. (“This litigation is likely to fail and will consume significant amounts of 
taxpayers’ hard-earned money in the process.”)
f. The collection of legal challenges to the Patient Protection Act include other legal arguments in addition to these two constitutional 
claims, including the Thomas More Center’s claims that the Patient Protection Act violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause, and additionally amounts to an unconstitutional tax; the Association of American 
Physicians and Surgeons’ claims that the Act was passed in violation of federal officials’ fiduciary duties to the United States; and the 
New Jersey Physicians, Inc.’s claim that the Act “denies the republican nature of our system of government.” 
g. Chief Justice William Rehnquist; member of USSC from September 26, 1986-September 3, 2005.
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votes similarly to President Obama’s first selection) appears 
to be unchanged on matters of federalism. It might even be 
said that on these contentious matters, the Supreme Court 
has been as partisan as Washington’s other politicians. 
Thus, there is an ideological parallel between the 
legislative politics that surround passage of the Patient 
Protection Act and the judicial politics underlying the 
Rehnquist Court’s new federalism. However, perhaps unlike 
the nation’s elected officials, the Supreme Court features 
the admirable quality that even when bitterly divided, the 
Court’s majorities and dissents must justify their votes on 
principled and detailed legal arguments. The Court puts 
on an intellectually transparent process, and any judicial 
action is expected to relate to current law and be attendant 
to values that reflect the foundation of our system of 
government. Accordingly, those legal principles and political 
values deserve serious discussion.
Enumerated Powers
The search for enumerated constitutional powers 
that authorize Congress to pass the Patient Protection 
Act includes a clever lawyer’s trick: the matter of 
characterization. The lawsuits aimed at the Act include a 
challenge to the “individual mandate,” the requirement that 
each American (subject to certain exceptions and subsidies) 
is required to purchase health insurance. Congress’ authority 
to require such a mandate would fall under Congress’ power 
to regulate interstate commerce. However, some cleverly 
observe that the so-called individual mandate is merely a tax 
(and, at a maximum of $2,250 per family per year, not a very 
large tax) that is assessed on those who opt not to purchase 
health insurance, much like a fine the Environmental 
Protection Agency might impose on those who fail to comply 
with certain environmental regulations. If the “mandate” is 
nothing more than a tax, then Congress’ power to impose 
such a mandate-cum-tax falls under its general taxing 
powers. Accordingly, how one characterizes what Congress 
has done can meaningfully determine whether Congress has 
the power to do it.
The Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause grants the federal government the 
power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among 
the several States.”11 The Supreme Court in the previous 
century took the Commerce Clause on a jurisprudential 
rollercoaster, first reading the Clause narrowly to authorize 
Congress to regulate strictly commercial matters that 
indisputably involved interstate transactions, and then 
reading the Clause broadly to authorize Congress to regulate 
any conduct that indirectly affected interstate prices and 
commercial exchange (which is virtually everything). The 
Rehnquist Court pulled the pendulum back in the 1995 
seminal case United States v. Lopez,12 both reasserting 
limits to Congress’ commerce power and reiterating that 
the federal government is endowed only with enumerated 
powers.
In United States v. Lopez, the Court ruled that Congress did 
not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to pass 
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited 
the possession of a firearm in a school zone. Writing for the 
five-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded 
that “[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor 
contains a requirement that the possession be connected 
in any way to interstate commerce.”13 The Court went on to 
rule that unless a disputed congressional action squarely 
regarded a channel or instrument of interstate commerce, 
then Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is 
limited to activities that “substantially affect” interstate 
commerce.14
Lopez, much more than invalidating the Gun Free School 
Zones Act of 1990, reestablished limits to Congress’ 
commerce power,h and it accordingly holds great appeal to 
conservative jurists and politicians who object to laws that 
restrain or dictate economic conduct. Many opponents 
of the Patient Protection Act invoke these conservative 
principles in objecting to the Act’s “individual mandate” 
for the purchase of health insurance, arguing that requiring 
individuals to purchase any good or service infringes on 
economic liberties and amounts to a government intrusion 
into the personal sphere. Accordingly, invoking Lopez, they 
argue that such a government mandate is beyond the powers 
allocated to Congress by the Constitution. Georgetown Law 
Professor and libertarian jurist Randy Barnett argues that 
the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate 
only commercial activities, and that “the health care 
mandate does not purport to regulate or prohibit activity 
of any kind, whether economic or noneconomic. To the 
contrary, it purports to ‘regulate’ inactivity.”15 Conservative 
legal commentator David Rivkin offers a more existential 
argument, decrying that “the problem with an individual 
insurance purchase mandate…is that it does not regulate 
any transactions at all. It regulates human beings, simply 
because they exist.”16 And John Yoo, who served as Deputy 
Attorney General under President George W. Bush, puts it 
in blunt and colloquial terms: “the Court has never upheld 
a federal law that punishes Americans for exercising their 
God-given right to do absolutely nothing.”17 
Jurists supportive of the Patient Protection Act are 
predictably both more sympathetic to exercises of federal 
power and more expansive in interpreting what federal 
powers are authorized under the Commerce Clause. Some, 
such as the American Constitutional Society’s Simon 
h. The Supreme Court, in another bitter five-to-four decision, reaffirmed these limits on Congress’ commerce power in United States v. 
Morrison (2000), which invalidated certain provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
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Lazarus, argue that even under Lopez, the individual mandate 
is squarely within the powers authorized by the Commerce 
Clause. Since insurance markets often require regulation to 
facilitate risk pooling, avoid adverse selection, and organize 
efficient claims administration, Lazarus concludes that the 
individual mandate is an “eminently lawful” exercise of the 
Commerce Clause’s power.18 Noted liberal scholar and dean 
of the University of California Irvine School of Law, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, frames the conservative argument in terms of 
individual rights rather than on limits on federal power, and 
argues that “there is no constitutionally protected freedom 
to be able to refuse to be insured or to avoid paying for the 
benefits provided.”16
Within the debates interpreting the scope of Lopez 
and the meaning of the Patent Protection Act’s individual 
mandate, an ideological divide emerges that parallels the 
divide among the legislators who debated it in Congress. 
Although legal analysis is often depicted as a technical and 
non-ideological enterprise, it should not be surprising that 
one’s political philosophy—and perhaps one’s opinion of the 
underlying legislation—shape one’s legal analysis.i What 
might distinguish this constitutional debate from typical 
political clashes, however, is how necessarily forward-
looking it is. It is—or should be—recognized that whatever 
the Constitution authorizes a Democratic Congress to do 
today, it theoretically authorizes a Republican Congress to 
do tomorrow.
The General Welfare Clause 
Congress’ power to tax falls within the General Welfare 
Clause, which empowers Congress “To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States.”19 If the “individual mandate” is little more than a tax 
(that can be avoided if insurance is purchased), then the 
constitutionality of the mandate-cum-tax is assessed under 
the General Welfare Clause.j
The General Welfare Clause has not (yet) undergone 
the same jurisprudential swings as the Commerce Clause. 
Although the Supreme Court in the 1930s and 1940s 
concurrently expanded Congress’ authority under both 
clauses, the Rehnquist Court pulled back only on the 
Commerce Clause power. In contrast, the Court has not 
departed from its New Deal rulings that granted Congress 
broad authority and discretion to tax under the General 
Welfare Clause. 
The leading authority continues to be the 1936 case 
of United States v. Butler,20 in which the Court, echoing 
Alexander Hamilton during the Constitutional Convention, 
ruled that the General Welfare Clause gives Congress “a 
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by 
the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the 
general welfare of the United States.”21 The Court later gave 
Congress additional latitude under the Clause, ruling that 
Congress also had the discretion to decide whether certain 
taxes or expenditures advance “the general welfare.”22 
This constitutional threshold is much more easily satisfied 
than the Lopez test, and thus current interpretations of the 
General Welfare Clause likely support Congress’ authority 
for instituting the tax embedded within the Patient Protection 
Act’s insurance mandate.k,23 
Of course, what the Supreme Court giveth it can also 
taketh away. Some have advocated that Lopez and the 
Rehnquist Court’s other federalism watershed decisions 
should be extended to Butler, and thereby limit Congress’ 
authority under the General Welfare clause.24 It certainly 
is possible that the Court might reign in Congress’ other 
powers, including those under the General Welfare Clause, 
and continue the Rehnquist Court’s reconceptualization of 
federalism. While such a ruling would likely expose many 
laws to new constitutional scrutiny, it also would reduce 
the sometimes artificial distinction between mandates from 
taxes.
Independent Limits to Federal Power—Anti-
Commandeering and the 10th Amendment
Even if the power to pass the Patient Protection Act does 
fall within Congress’ enumerated powers, independent 
constitutional limits on federal authority might nonetheless 
make the Act unconstitutional. The state Attorneys General 
invoke a number of constitutional provisions—including 
Article 1 Sect. 1, Article 1 Sect. 2, and Amendments 5, 9, 
and 10—that, they claim, are designed to preserve their 
states’ sovereignty against overreaching federal policy. 
i. This phenomenon might be related to “cognitive biases” exhibited by other professionals, such as how environmental forces and 
preexisting beliefs have been shown to frequently shape physician diagnoses. See, for example, Wennberg D, Dickens J Jr, Soule D, et 
al. The relationship between the supply of cardiac catheterization laboratories, cardiologists and the use of invasive cardiac procedures 
in northern New England. J Health Serv Res Policy. 1997;2(2):75-80. 
j. Perhaps the leading commentator who characterizes the mandate as a tax (for constitutional purposes) is Jack Balkin, a professor at 
Yale Law School and creator of the popular Balkinization blog for constitutional legal analysis.
k. Even if the individual mandate is, for constitutional purposes, merely a tax, some of the complaints allege that it is an unconstitutional 
tax, prohibited by Article I, Sect. 2 and Sect. 9. These constitutional provisions prohibit direct capitation taxes on individuals, such as 
head taxes, if they are not apportioned by the states. Critics of the Patient Protection Act argue that the mandate-cum-tax is a direct 
capitation tax because it is assessed on each individual. Defenders say it is a penalty tax, not a capitation tax, because it does not tax the 
general population but rather a subset of individuals based on their conduct. The Supreme Court has narrowly defined direct taxes and 
thus limited the taxes that would require state apportionment, but it has spoken very infrequently on the distinctions among permissible 
and impermissible taxes since the 16th Amendment, authorizing Congress to impose an income tax, was ratified in 1913.
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The length of this list of constitutional provisions suggests 
that the argument in defense of state sovereignty is based 
as much on the structure of the Constitution as it is on any 
single clause. But more than any competing provision, the 
10th Amendment represents the Constitution’s protections 
of state sovereignty, and the leading cases that protect that 
authority are derived primarily from that Amendment.
The 10th Amendment, in its entirety, reads “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”25 Justice Storyl famously 
described the Amendment as “a mere affirmation of what, 
upon any just reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting 
the Constitution,” and saying little more than “what 
is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state 
authorities.”26 Nonetheless, the 10th Amendment has come 
to represent the “Court’s consistent understanding [that] 
‘the States unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure 
of sovereign authority.’”27
The 1992 case of New York v. United States28 is a 
modern and seminal expression of the Court’s recent 10th 
Amendment jurisprudence. The case arose when New York 
State objected to its obligations under the Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, in which Congress 
required states to devise plans to dispose of waste 
generated within their borders. After conceding that “the 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady 
path,”29 a five-member Supreme Court majority ruled that 
the 10th Amendment prohibited full implementation of the 
1985 Act. The Court concluded that the 10th Amendment 
restricts how the federal government may “use the States as 
implements of regulation,” and that it specifically proscribes 
Congress from “commandeer[ing] the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”30 The Act accordingly 
violated the 10th Amendment by “commandeering” the 
states’ legislatures to implement the federal waste disposal 
policies. The Supreme Court, in an identical and equally 
contentious five-to-four decision, reiterated the 10th 
Amendment’s “anti-commandeering” protections of state 
sovereignty in Printz v. United States (ruling, in 1997, that the 
10th Amendment prohibits Congress from commandeering 
state executives to implement federal policy) and Alden v. 
Maine (ruling, in 1999, that the 10th Amendment similarly 
prohibits the commandeering of state courts).
It is this resistance to being “commandeered” by federal 
policy, and the anti-commandeering principles embedded in 
New York and related 10th Amendment cases, that motivate 
the state Attorneys’ General second species of constitutional 
challenges to the Patient Protection Act. This same 
inclination to assert state autonomy motivated the State 
of Virginia to enact a “nullification statute” stating that “no 
resident of this Commonwealth…shall be required to obtain 
or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage.”31 
(Idaho and Utah have enacted similar statutes, and at least 
33 states are reportedly considering other measures.)32 The 
constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection Act arise 
from the states’ attempts to assert sovereignty over their 
own health policy.
The state Attorneys’ General complaints specifically 
protest the Patient Protection Act’s charging states to 
establish local insurance exchanges, in which state residents 
can purchase, and the state’s insurance companies can 
market, health insurance policies. The complaints allege that 
setting up these exchanges will require state budgetary and 
personnel resources, and that the Patient Protection Act’s 
expansion of Medicaid benefits will burden already-strained 
state Medicaid programs. These requirements amount, 
according to the complaint drafted by the Florida Attorney 
General, to “effectively co-opting the Plaintiffs’ control over 
their budgetary processes and legislative agendas through 
compelling them to assume costs they cannot afford, and 
…depriv[ing] them of their sovereignty and their right to a 
republican form of government.”7
Defenders of the Patient Protection Act first observe that 
Medicaid is a voluntary program from which states may 
opt out, if they are willing to forgo their share of the very 
substantial federal Medicaid funds.m Moreover, they observe 
that states are merely invited to set up their exchanges, and 
that the federal government will set one up for them if they 
fail to do so. These legislative provisions might reflect what 
the New York Times described as the Patient Protection Act’s 
“careful” drafting process, designed for the new law “to 
withstand just this kind of challenge. 
Perhaps a larger legal obstacle to these assertions of 
state autonomy is the Supremacy Clause, which states that 
Congressional Acts ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’”34 
Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, Timothy Jost, 
a professor at Washington and Lee University School of 
Law, cites unsuccessful examples of state nullification laws 
throughout history, suggesting that “although the [Virginia] 
bill is phrased in the passive voice, its intent is clearly to 
block the implementation of a federal mandate requiring all 
individuals to carry health insurance. But achieving this aim 
is constitutionally impossible.”35 Accordingly, the federal 
government’s authority is supreme so long as it operates 
l. Chief Justice Joseph Story; member of USSC from November 18, 1811–September 10, 1845. 
m. The Supreme Court in New York reiterated that Congress retains broad authority to induce certain action from states by placing 
conditions on federal funding. 505 US 144, 166-67. It has been observed that the growth of the federal government might mean 
that giving Congress broad “spending power” could undermine any remaining federalism limit on federal authority, and thus the 
Supreme Court might ultimately reign in this broad authority as well. See Siegel NS. Dole’s future: a strategic analysis. Sup Ct Econ Rev. 
2008;16:165-204.
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within its enumerated powers and does not encroach upon 
an independent constitutional limit, and just as the federal 
government might be limited from making state policy, the 
states are prevented from making (or blocking) federal 
policy. Thus, although parts of the Constitution are clearly 
designed to protect state sovereignty, other—arguably more 
potent—parts clearly limit it.
Next Steps? Political Rhetoric, Legal Parsing, 
and Substantive Policy 
Some conservative legal scholars have said publicly that 
the Attorneys’ General suits (and likewise similar arguments 
by conservative jurists) are politically motivated and are 
unlikely to garner judicial sympathy. Charles Fried, who 
served as Solicitor General under President Ronald Regan, 
was quoted for saying of the legal challenge, “I am prepared 
to say it’s complete nonsense.”36 But most Court watchers 
were surprised when the Court handed down Lopez, the first 
judicially-imposed limit on Commerce Clause authority since 
the New Deal, and the Court’s recent expansion of the 10th 
Amendment similarly reversed prior constitutional trends 
and expectations. Given the Court’s often unpredictable 
penchant for leveraging a five-member majority to achieve 
potent and far-reaching constitutional shifts, the legislative 
significance of the Patient Protection Act might attract, 
rather than deter, Supreme Court scrutiny.n Of course, since 
most of the Patient Protection Act’s provisions won’t go 
into effect until 2014, the identity and proclivity of that five-
member majority remains unknown. 
Yet there remain at least two tragic disconnects in this 
rhetorical debate over federal power. The first is the irony 
between the states’ assertions of sovereignty and the states’ 
true potential to shape health care policy. The real source of 
frustration to advocates of state sovereignty in health policy 
is that, at least since 1965, American health policy has been 
largely federal policy. It has become conventional policy 
wisdom that meaningful health reform requires federal 
action, whereas state action is sought primarily by those 
pursuing incremental reform or experimental tinkering. Yet 
state law governs a host of important implements of health 
policy—including professional licensure, medical torts, 
insurance regulation, and the administration of Medicaid—
that arguably exceeds the significance of federal policy. 
Because the size and influence of the federal budget swamps 
what states can afford, it is predictable and understandable 
that the federal government has the oversized influence on 
health policy (and most policies) that it does. But this need 
not be so. To the contrary, it might be in state experiments—
particularly the fusion of health policy with the instruments 
of other policy, such as education and public safety—
that holds the greatest promise for redressing America’s 
health crisis. The nation continues to invest in health 
care expenditures without recouping returns in improved 
health, so perhaps it is the non-medical and ground-level 
reforms—which are in the domain of the states—that will 
have the greatest impact.o Thus, those seeking to assert 
state sovereignty in making health policy both have a broad 
menu of meaningful policy options available and should be 
encouraged to thoughtfully exercise that sovereignty. 
The second disconnect is between the rhetoric and reality 
of the Patient Protection Act, which is commonly presumed 
to be (even if constitutional) an expansive exercise in federal 
power. In budgetary terms, and perhaps in constitutional 
terms, it arguably is. But it can barely be expected to put 
a dent into America’s growing and consuming health 
care crisis. The nation’s health care system is commonly 
characterized as a three-dimensional crisis of insufficient 
access, excessive costs, and inadequate quality. The Patient 
Protection Act might amount to a meaningful expansion in 
health care access, but it does nothing to reduce the costs 
of health care or improve the quality of health care services. 
For a nation that now spends over 17% of its gross domestic 
product on health care and over twice the per capita average 
of the 10 richest nations,37 yet exhibits health outcomes that 
are worse than nearly all of its OECD colleagues,p laurels 
cannot rest following an expansion of access. Far from 
being either “reforms that generations of Americans have 
fought for”1 or a “trillion dollar assault on our freedoms,”4 
the Patient Protection Act is more likely a mere first step in 
a desperately needed overhaul of our health care system. 
Unless health care expenditures are contained, and unless 
our health care system can more efficiently improve the 
nation’s heath, then the Act’s expansion of access to 
health insurance will mean little more than accelerating 
n. Shortly after the Bill’s passage, Georgia’s Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss insisted, “There are such significant issues that the 
court could very well declare the bill unconstitutional.” See, “Healthcare reform may reach high court.” UPI.com website. http://www.
upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/03/29/Healthcare-reform-may-reach-high-court/UPI-22701269882434/. Published March 29, 2010. 
But George Washington University Law professor Orin Kerr took a pragmatic view of the chances a challenge would actually make it 
to the Supreme Court: “there would first need to be a circuit court that would vote to strike down the mandate. Presumably you’d have 
to bring the challenge…; pray you get a panel with at least two of the circuit’s more aggressive conservatives; and then hope you can 
get past a rehearing vote. But the odds of that are pretty low. There’s a chance, I think, but it’s a relatively low one.” Kerr O. More on the 
chances courts would strike down individual mandates. The Volokh Conspiracy website. http://volokh.com/2010/03/23/more-on-the-
chances-courts-would-strike-down-the-individual-mandate/. Published Mar. 23, 2010. 
o. My own foray into this topic is: Richman B. Behavioral economics and health policy: understanding Medicaid’s failure. Cornell L Rev. 
2005;90(3):705-768. 
p. Some health statistics detailing how the United States compares to other OECD nations are available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.as
px?QueryName=254&QueryType=View. 
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overspending and squeezing out other social investments. 
Hopefully any debate over the constitutionality of the 
Patient Protection Act will not distract the public from the 
substantial work that remains. NCMJ
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